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JUSTICE DELAYED IS, ONCE AGAIN, JUSTICE DENIED: 1 
THE OVERDUE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CIVIL CASES 
Debra Gardnert 
On August 7, 2006, Michael Greco, then-President of the American 
Bar Association (ABA), called upon its House of Delegates to 
address one of the most pressing contemporary problems facing the 
justice system in this country:2 "[W]hen litigants cannot effectively 
navigate the legal system, they are denied access to fair and impartial 
dispute resolution, the adversarial process itself breaks down and the 
courts cannot properly perform their role of delivering a just result.,,3 
The House of Delegates unanimously answered this call by resolving 
that: 
[T]he American Bar Association urges federal, state, and 
territorial governments to provide legal counsel as a matter 
of right at public expense to low income persons in those 
categories of adversarial proceedings where basic human 
t Debra Gardner has served as Legal Director of the Public Justice Center (PJC) since 
2000, where she engages in civil rights and poverty litigation l4ld other advocacy. 
Before joining the PJC, she worked in poverty law at the Legal. Aid Bureau in 
Maryland for more than fifteen years. Gardner obtained a J.D. in 1982 from 
Northeastern University School of Law and an A.B. in 1979 from Mount Holyoke 
College. Among her duties at the PJC, she pursues a judicial recognition of a civil 
right to counsel under the Maryland Declaration of Rights and coordinates the 
National Coalition for a Civil Right to Counsel. 
I. Inspiration for this title is of course drawn from the letter composed by Dr. Martin 
Luther King, Jr., on April 16, 1963, after being arrested for participating in numerous 
civil rights demonstrations in Birmingham, Alabama. Imprisoned in the Birmingham 
City Jail, King wrote of the desperate need for equal rights for all individuals. Letter 
from Martin Luther King, Jr. (April 16, 1963), in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE 
ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 289, 292 (James Melvin 
Washington ed., 1986) ("We must come to see with the distinguished jurist of 
yesterday that 'justice too long delayed is justice denied. '''). 
2. Michael S. Greco, President, American Bar Association, Remarks to the House of 
Delegates at the American Bar Association Annual Meeting 6-7 (Aug. 7, 2006) 
(transcript available at http://www.abanet.orglop/greco/speeches/aba~reco_hod_ 
final_remarks. doc ). 
3. American Bar Association Task Force on Access to Civil Justice, ABA Resolution on 
Right to Counsel, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIv. RTS. L. REv. 507, 518 (2006), available at 
http://www.abanet.orgilegalservices/sclaididownloads/06A 112A.pdf [hereinafter 
ABA Task Force]. 
59 
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needs are at stake, such as those involving shelter, 
sustenance, safety., health or child custody, as determined by 
each jurisdiction. 4 
This brief article attempts to answer the questions: 
How did we5 arrive at this historic moment? 
What came before? 
Where are we now? 
And, what happens next?6 
The notion of a civil right to counsel did not begin with the ABA 
Resolution. 7 While it is often referred to colloquially as Civil 
Gideon,8 for the landmark case of Gideon v. Wainwright,9 which 
provided for appointed counsel for indigent defendants in criminal 
matters,IO it did not begin with Gideon either. I I Among its earliest 
tracings is a Tudor codification. 12 This English law provided that 
"the Justices... shall assigne to the same pou psone or psones 
Councell lerned by their discrecions which shall geve their 
Councelles nothing taking for the same, and in like wise the same 
Justices shall appoynte attorney and attorneies for the same pou 
4. ld. at 508. 
5. By "we" the author refers to all those in the United States who pursue access to 
justice for the poor and hopes the reader counts herself or himself in that legion. 
6. This is by no means intended as an exhaustive recitation of historical developments 
that are relevant to the evolution of a civil right to counsel, but merely as a brief 
overview. 
7. See, e.g., Paul Marvy, Thinking About a Civil Right to Counsel Since 1923, 40 
CLEARINGHOUSE REv. J. POVERTY L. & POL. 170 (2006). 
8. ABA TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 515. 
9. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
10. ld. at 344-45. 
11. Marvy, supra note 7, at 170. 
12. 11 HEN. 7, ch. 12 (1495), reprinted in 2 STATUTES OF THE REALM 578 (1816), 
micro/armed on Microcard No. 55E53 (Matthew Bender & Co.) [hereinafter 11 HEN. 
7, ch. 12]. It has also been argued that the right to counsel in civil cases goes back 
even farther, deriving from Chapter 40 of the Magna Carta of 1215. MAGNA CARTA 
ch. 40, reprinted in WILLIAM SHARP MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA: A COMMENTARY 
ON THE GREAT CHARTER OF KING JOHN 395 (2d ed. 1914) ("To no one will we sell, to 
no one will we refuse or delay, right or justice."). See, e.g., John MacArthur 
Maguire, Poverty and Civil Litigation, 36 HARV. L. REV. 361, 363-64 (1923). 
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psone or psones .... " 13 As described elsewhere,14 this statute has 
been incorporated into the common law of Maryland through Article 
V of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. IS It has likewise been 
incorporated by many if not most other states. 16 However, it is safe 
to say that such a common law right has been little known or 
exercised in modem times,17 and poor litigants await contemporary 
judicial acknowledgement of its vitality. 18 
More recently, scholars, jurists, and advocates have theorized and 
written about the need for, and various doctrinal bases for, a civil 
right to counsel since at least early in the last century.19 They were 
no doubt motivated by the gaping, unmet need for legal advocacy for 
the poor, which they would have observed in their courtrooms, legal 
aid offices, law firms, and communities on a daily basis over many 
decades, and which continues unabated. 20 
All the while, the right to appointed counsel in criminal cases was 
evolving. 21 The Supreme Court had said in Betts v. Brady,22 that 
whether there was a right to counsel, under the due process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, for an indigent 
criminal defendant in state court should be determined on a case-by-
case basis. 23 In reaching that result, the Court surveyed 
constitutional and statutory provisions for a categorical right in the 
various states and concluded that "in the great majority of the States, 
it has been the considered judgment of the people, their 
representatives and their courts that appointment of counsel is not a 
13. 11 HEN. 7, ch. 12. 
14. Stephen H. Sachs, Seeking a Right to Appointed Counsel in Civil Cases in Maryland, 
37 U. BALT. L. REV. 5, 17 (2007). 
15. MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. V. 
16. See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 933 (1997). 
17. See, e.g., Robert W. Sweet, Civil Gideon and Confidence in a Just Society, 17 YALE 
L. & POL'y REV. 503, 504 (1998). 
18. See, e.g., Frase v. Barnhart, 379 Md. 100, 126-29, 840 A.2d 114, 129-30 (2003) 
(where a narrow majority of the court declined to reach the issue of right to counsel, 
including the incorporation of 11 HEN. 7, ch. 12 through article V). 
19. See Marvy, supra note 7, at 170. 
20. See LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA 6-7 
(2005), http://www.lsc.gov/press/documentsILSC%20Justice%20Gap_FINAL_100 I. 
pdf. 
21. See, e.g., Yale Kasimar et aI., Gideon at 40: Facing the Crisis, Fulfilling the 
Promise, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 135, 136-39 (2004). 
22. 316 U.S. 455 (1942). 
23. Id. at 462. Scholars of local legal history will be interested to note that Betts arose in 
Carroll County, Maryland. Id. at 456. 
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fundamental right, essential to a fair trial. ,,24 The Court found only 
nine states to have a broad right to counsel commensurate with that 
provided in federal courts by the Sixth Amendment. 25 
Just twenty-one years later, in 1962, the Court decided Gideon and 
overruled Betts. 26 The Gideon Court suggested the Betts Court had 
read its older precedents, which were "sounder we believe than the 
new," too narrowly.27 The Court was speaking primarily of Powell v. 
Alabama,28 in which it had said ten years before Betts: 
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail 
if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. 
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and 
sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with 
crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself 
whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar 
with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel 
he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and 
convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence 
irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks 
both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his 
defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the 
guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings 
against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces 
the danger of conviction because he does not know how to 
establish his innocence. 29 
For purposes of this discussion of the evolution of recognition of 
rights, it is especially noteworthy that twenty-two states took the 
extraordinary step of filing an amicus brief on behalf of an accused 
robber against the state government, urging that Betts be overruled, 
while onl¥t two supported Florida's view that Betts should not be 
disturbed. 0 
24. [d. at 471. 
25. [d. at 467-68. These states were Georgia, Iowa, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, 
New Jersey, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and West Virginia. [d. at 468 n.21. 
26. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,345 (1963). 
27. /d. at 344. 
28. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
29. [d. at 68-69. 
30. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 336, 345. Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, 
Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Missouri, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, 
Washington, and West Virginia filed an amicus brief urging the overruling of Betts. 
See Brief for the State Government as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (No. 155). Alabama, joined by North Carolina, 
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For those who thought this progression might cross over to the civil 
side of the courts, hopes were dashed another two decades later when 
the Court issued its decision in Lassiter v. Department of Social 
Services. 31 The case involved a civil proceeding focusing on the 
termination of parental rights. 32 Instead of heeding the lesson of 
Gideon and embracing the right as fundamental,33 along with the ease 
of administration of a categorical right, the Court returned to the 
premise that whether counsel was necessary to satisfy due process 
should be determined case by case. 34 Worse, it announced a 
presumption that there is no right to counsel in a civil case unless the 
litigant faces a loss of physical liberty,35 defined narrowly as 
confinement. 36 
The ruling is particularly disturbing,37 because Justice Potter 
Stewart, writing for a five-member majority, recognized "that a 
parent's desire for and right to 'the companionship, care, custody[,] 
and management of his [ or her] children' is an important interest that 
'undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing 
interest, protection, ",38 and termination of parental rights constitutes 
"a unique kind of deprivation," and "therefore a commanding one.,,39 
It is all the more disturbing for the majority's recognition that thirty-
three states already provided for appointed counsel in such 
proceedings.4o Lamenting that the U.S. Constitution does not require 
a higher standard,41 Justice Stewart applauded "the standards 
filed on the other side. See Brief for the State of Alabama as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondent, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (No. 155). 
31. 452 U.S. 18 (1981). 
32. /d. at 21. 
33. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 343. 
34. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31-32. 
35. ld. at 26-27. 
36. Compare id. ("[A]n indigent litigant has a right to appointed counsel only when ... 
he may be deprived of his physical liberty.") with id. at 40 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
("I do not believe that our cases support the presumption . . . that physical 
confinement is the only loss of liberty grievous enough to trigger a right to appointed 
counsel .... "). 
37. The reader will perhaps indulge the author a moment's personal reflection that she 
was entering her third year of law school and preparing for a lifelong career in civil 
legal services for the poor when Lassiter came down-a foreboding portend to be 
sure. 
38. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27 (alteration of original to reflect quotations) (internal 
quotation marks added) (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,651 (1972». 
39. ld. 
40. ld. at 34. 
41. ld. at 33-34. 
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increasingly urged by informed public opinion and now widely 
followed by the States [as] enlightened and wise.,,42 
Predictably, Lassiter all but shut the door to pro¥ress on achieving 
a broad civil right to counsel, at least for a time.4 It has generated 
upwards of five hundred appellate court decisions around the country 
discussing some aspect of its analysis of a constitutional right to 
counsel on the civil side, which can easily be described as all over the 
map.44 Nonetheless, it appears usually to have resulted in a denial of 
counsel. 45 
The attention of those who strive for equal justice for the poor was 
captured, virtually by force, for the next two decades by ideological 
and financial attacks on civil legal services for the poor. 46 
Every creative and innovative effort has been brought to bear to 
replace dwindling federal financial support for legal services, 
including Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts (IOLTA) programs, 
civil filing fee surcharges, bar dues surcharges, and aggressive 
private fundraising. 47 In addition, resources have been stretched as 
far as they will go through programs providing limited advice to 
those who are forced to represent themselves, internet-accessed and 
other legal educational materials, and other forms of so-called 
"unbundled" legal services. 48 The result of all of these efforts: the 
42. Id. at 34. 
43. Alan W. Houseman, Commentary, Future Changes and Prospects for Legal Aid and 
Public Defender Organizations, 24 QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 557, 575 (2006). 
44. See generally Clare Pastore, Life After Lassiter: An Overview of State-Court Right-to-
Counsel Decisions, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. J. POVERTY L. & POL. 186 (2006). 
45. Id. at 186. One bright spot in this landscape is that virtually all states now provide by 
statute for counsel in termination of parental rights proceedings. See Laura K. Abel 
& Max Rettig, State Statutes Providing for a Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 40 
CLEARINGHOUSE REv. J. POVERTY L. & POL. 245, 252-60 (2006). 
46. See generally ALAN W. HOUSEMAN & LINDA E. PERLE, CENTER FOR LAW AND SOCIAL 
POLICY, SECURING EQUAL JUSTICE FOR ALL: A BRIEF HISTORY OF CiVIL LEGAL 
ASSISTANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 29-46 (2007), http://www.c1asp.org/publications/ 
legal_aid_history_2007.pdf (tracing the history of federal funding cuts and political 
restrictions placed on civil legal services from the Reagan era to the present). See 
also Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 159-60 (\998) (holding that 
Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts (IOL TA), a funding scheme for civil legal aid 
created by states in response to federal funding cuts, is private property for purposes 
of the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against government taking without just 
compensation). But see Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 2\6, 220, 240 
(2003) (holding that funding civil legal services is a public use, that IOL T A programs 
do not involve a regulatory taking, and that no compensation is required because such 
programs do not occasion any financial loss to property owner). 
47. HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 46, at 34, 44. 
48. Id. at 45-46. An attorney provides unbundled legal services when she performs 
specific, individual tasks for a client rather than performing the full range of services 
2007) Justice Delayed is, Once Again, Justice Denied 65 
poor, overall, have barely held their ground. 49 Steady increases in 
the poverty population and continued stagnation of federal funding 
have offset the gains made by equal access to justice advocates 
throughout the nation. 50 Studies continue to show the same level of 
unmet need for legal services among those who cannot afford to hire 
a lawyer. 5 I 
It is not surprising then that some poor litigants and their advocates 
persevered in seeking recognition of a right to counsel, despite the 
setback of Lassiter. One notable early example is the case of 
Donaldson v. State of New York, 52 where low-income tenants in New 
York brought an action arguing for a right to counsel in eviction 
cases. 53 Although the case was dismissed on procedural grounds, 54 
conventional wisdom indicates that it helped to create the impetus for 
a substantial increase in local funding for civil legal aid in eviction 
cases. 
The tum of the century marked a true revival of the effort to obtain 
recognition of a right to counsel in civil cases. 55 In both Washington 
and Maryland, among others, research had begun on potential legal 
claims for a right to counsel under state constitutions. 56 Appeals 
were mounted in cases involving poor litigants who could not 
navigate the legal proceedings in which they found themselves 
embroiled without a lawyer. 57 
Unfortunately, these early cases did not result in a ruling squarely 
on the issue. The case of Smith v. City of Moses Lake58 involved a 
low-income senior citizen seeking to protect his self-built home of 
she ordinarily would when retained by a client. Forrest S. Mosten, Unbundling of 
Legal Services and the Family Lawyer, 28 FAM. L. Q. 421, 422-23 (1994). 
49. LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, supra note 20, at 8, 14, 19. 
50. Dennis Archer, Comments at the Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics Symposium: 
Access to Justice: Does it Exist in Civil Cases? (2004), in 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
455, 457-58 (2004). 
51. LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, supra note 20, at 7-8. 
52. 548 N.Y.S.2d 676 (App. Div. 1989). 
53. Id. at 676-77. 
54. See id. 
55. See generally John Nethercut, "This Issue Will Not Go Away": Continuing to Seek 
the Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 38 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POVERTY L. & POL. 
481 (2004). 
56. For more detailed descriptions of the preparation and development underlying the 
effort in Maryland, see Sachs, supra note 14. See also Nethercut, supra note 55, at 
481-82. 
57. Nethercut, supra note 55, at 481-82. 
58. No. 21783-3-I1I (Wash. Ct. App. May 21,2003). 
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fifty years from condemnation. 59 Mr. Smith died while his appeal 
was pending, and the case was dismissed as moot. 60 In re Custody of 
Halls61 and Frase v. Barnhart,62 both custody disputes, were decided 
on other grounds favorable to the unrepresented parent. 63 In Frase, 
however, three members of the seven-member Court of Appeals of 
Maryland filed a concurring opinion indicating that they would have 
reached the issue and would have found a right to counsel under the 
Maryland Declaration of Rights. 64 
While these renewed efforts were taking shape, it happened that the 
annual conference of the National Legal Aid and Defender 
Association65 was taking place in Seattle in November of 2003. 66 
Local hosts and organizerc included Deborah Perluss, General 
Counsel to the Northwest Justice Project, Washington's largest civil 
legal services program.67 Ms. Perluss spearheaded the inclusion of a 
workshop on a civil right to counsel in the annual conference 
agenda.6 At the time, the Frase case had been argued just a month 
before-and would be decided the month after. 69 Panelists included 
the author who described the development of the Frase appeal and 
the legal theories for a right to counsel under the Constitution of 
Maryland. 70 
What shortly became the National Coalition for a Civil Right to 
Counsel (NCCRC or the Coalition) was born during that workshop, 
when the author circulated a sign-up sheet, promising to set up a 
59. See id. 
60. See id. 
61. 109 P.3d 15 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005). 
62. 379 Md. 100,840 A.2d 114 (2003). 
63. Frase, 379 Md. at 102,840 A.2d at 115; Halls, 109 P.3d at 17. 
64. 379 Md. at 141,840 A.2d at 138. 
65. The National Legal Aid and Defender Association is the nation's oldest and largest 
non-profit membership association, "devoting 100 percent of its resources to serving 
the broad equal justice community." About the NLADA, http://www.nlada.org/ 
About/About_Home (last visited Jan. 14,2008). 
66. Paul Marvy, "To Promote Jurisprudential Understanding of the Law": The Civil 
Right to Counsel in Washington State, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. J. POVERTY L. & 
POL. 180, 183 (2006). 
67. See id. The Northwest Justice Project is a nonprofit statewide organization that 
provides free legal services annually to "more than 18,000 people in need of critical 
legal assistance" throughout Washington. About the Northwest Justice Project, 
http://www.nwjustice.org/about_njp/index.html(last visited Jan. 14,2008). 
68. Marvy, supra note 66, at 183. 
69. Frase, 379 Md. at 100,840 A.2d at 114. 
70. Marvy, supra note 66, at 183. 
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listserv and host a national conference call in early 2004. 71 Today, 
the NCCRC is a broad-based association of 150 individuals and 
organizations from over thirty-five states committed to ensuring 
meaningful access to the courts for all. 72 Its mission is to encourage, 
support, and coordinate advocacy to expand recognition and 
implementation of a right to counsel in civil cases. 73 Its participants 
include legal services advocates and supporters from the public 
interest and private bars, academy, state and local bar associations, 
national organizations, and others. 74 It continues to be hosted by the 
Public Justice Center in Baltimore, Maryland. 75 
Participants in the NCCRC rely on each other for technical support, 
legal research and advice, strategic thinking, and other information-
sharing and networking. 76 Through monthly conference calls and the 
private, secure listserv, advocates all over the country keep abreast of 
developments and share their work. 77 In some states, as noted, 
litigation appears to be the best approach to gaining a civil right to 
counsel. 78 In others, an expansion of statutory rights through 
legislative advocacy may prevail. 79 In others, enforcement of 
statutory rights that exist on paper but appear to go unnoticed by the 
courts is a logical first step. 80 
During one of the earliest brainstorming sessions of the Coalition, 
several participants suggested exploring whether the ABA had ever 
taken a position on a civil right to counsel and what its views might 
be at this time. 81 Not long afterwards, under the auspices of Michael 
71. Debra Gardner, Pursuing a Right to Counsel in Civil Cases: Introduction and 
Overview, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POVERTY L. & POL. 167, 168 (2006). 
72. Id. 
73. Paul Marvy & Debra Gardner, A Civil Right to Counsel for the Poor, 32 HUM. RTS. 
1,9(2005). 
74. Gardner, supra note 71, at 168. 
75. See About the Public Justice Center, http://www.publicjustice.orglabout-us/index.cfm 
(last visited Jan. 14, 2008) ("The Public Justice Center pursues progressive, 
widespread and lasting social change by giving a legal voice to people who have 
been shut out of or ignored by society. "). 
76. Marvy & Gardner, supra note 73, at 8-9. 
77. Cynthia Di Pasquale, "Civil Gideon" Spreads its Wings, MD. DAILY REC., Mar. 10, 
2006, at Bl. 
78. See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text. 
79. ABA TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 519-20. 
80. See Abel & Rettig, supra note 45, at 245. 
81. Marcia Pal of, How to Start Advocating a Right to Counsel in Civil Cases in Your 
State: A Look at Ohio, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POVERTY L. & POL. 231, 234 
(2006). Although others certainly contributed to this early discussion, three women 
deserve credit for the inspiration and the ability to start a conversation with the ABA: 
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Greco's Presidential Task Force on Access to Justice, the ABA 
Resolution was crafted and Eresented to the ABA House of Delegates 
for its unanimous approval. 2 
The ABA was in a good position to speak with authority on this 
issue. 83 Its first two goals are promoting "improvements in the 
American system of justice" and "meaningful access to legal 
representation and the American system of justice for all persons 
regardless of their economic or social condition.,,84 It has played a 
critical role in creating, funding, and preserving civil legal services 
from the beginning. 85 Its first standing committee, created in 1920, 
was the Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants 
(SCLAID),86 which signaled the ABA's permanent commitment to 
the realization of access to justice for the poor. 87 Notably, this 
commitment resulted in the ABA filing an amicus brief in Lassiter 
urging recognition of a right to counsel in civil termination of 
parental rights proceedings as a matter of federal due process. 88 
With its historic Resolution, the ABA has once again 
fundamentally rejected the approach taken by the Supreme Court in 
Lassiter as a viable framework for ensuring access to justice in civil 
proceedings for indigent persons. 89 The Resolution was carefully 
crafted to address the kinds of legal proceedings that have the 
greatest impact on individual rights and basic human needs. 90 
Jayne Tyrrell, Executive Director of the Massachusetts IOL T A Committee, Mary 
Lavery Flynn, Director of Legal Services Outreach for the California Bar, and Mary 
Schneider, Executive Director of Legal Services of Northwest Minnesota. 
82. See Russell Engler, Shaping a Context-Based Civil Gideon from the Dynamics of 
Social Change, 15 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 697, 700 (2006). In addition to 
former President Greco, others who played key roles in the adoption of the ABA 
Resolution must be acknowledged, including the Honorable Howard Dana, Chair of 
the Task Force and retired Justice of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, William 
Whitehurst, former Chair of the ABA Standing Committee on Legal Aid and 
Indigent Defense (SCLAID), and Terrence Brooks, Staff Counsel to SCLAID. 
83. See American Bar Association, History of the American Bar Association, 
http://www.abanet.orglaboutlhistory.htrn1 (last visited Jan. 14,2008). 
84. See id. 
85. ABA TASKFORCE, supra note 3, at 508-12. 
86. Id. at 508. 
87. See id. at 508-10. 
88. Brief of the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 
Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (No. 79-6423). 
89. ABA TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 517-18. 
90. !d. at 521 ("The categories contained in this resolution are considered to involve 
interests so fundamental and critical as to require governments to supply lawyers to 
low income persons who otherwise cannot obtain counsel."). The fundamental 
nature of these basic human needs is also reflected in international human rights law. 
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There are those who might question the inclusion of child custody 
disputes, especially cases between private parties, among the basic 
human needs to which a civil right to counsel should be afforded. 91 
But the ABA did not shy away from a bold statement that such cases 
are among those most requiring lawyers for those who cannot afford 
to hire them. 92 
A parent's right to an unfettered relationship with her child has 
been called even "more precious ... than the right of life itself.,,93 
This interest occupies a unique place in our legal culture, 
given the centrality of family life as the focus for personal 
meaning and responsibility. "[F]ar more precious ... than 
property rights," parental rights have been deemed to be 
among those "essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness 
by free men," and to be more significant and priceless than 
"liberties which derive merely from shifting economic 
arrangements. ,,94 
Private custody disputes utilize the machinery of the state and the 
courts to alter the family relationship. The purportedly private nature 
of these cases is rendered less and less significant where trial courts 
access their own experts to conduct evaluations and studies of the 
parties, appoint guardians ad litem or counsel for the children, or 
even participate in questioning during trial. 95 An indigent 
unrepresented parent can easily face an array of resources and 
adversaries every bit as formidable as might exist in a state-initiated 
See International Covenant on Economic, Social & Cultural Rights, art. 10, Dec. 16, 
1966,963 U.N.T.S.14531. 
91. Cf ABA TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 508, 522 (resisting Civil Gideon in private 
child custody disputes by courts led the ABA to include support for the right in its 
resolution advocating counsel for low-income people in civil cases "where basic 
human needs are at stake"). 
92. Id. at 522. Besides the high stakes and the complexity of the proceedings, discussed 
infra, contested custody represents the area of greatest unmet need for civil legal 
services. See GLORIA DANZIGER, CENTER FOR FAMILIES, CHILDREN & THE COURTS, 
UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE SCHOOL OF LAW, MODEL CHILD CUSTODY 
REPRESENTATION PROJECT EVALUATION REPORT 1 (2003), available at 
http://www.mlsc.orgiChildCustodyEval.final.pdf. 
93. In re Welfare of Myricks, 533 P.2d 841,842 (Wash. 1975) (en banc) (quoting In re 
Gibson, 483 P.2d 131, 135 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971)). 
94. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18,38 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
95. See Frase v. Barnhart, 379 Md. 100, 121, 840 A.2d 114, 126 (2003). 
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parental rights tennination proceeding. 96 Further, the consequences 
of the judicial process are highly invasive and the impacts of 
potential error reach not only the parent, but the future lives of young 
children. 97 The notion that a loss of custody is not a pennanent and 
severe intrusion into the parent-child relationship does not withstand 
scrutiny. 98 Circumstances under which a parent can move for 
modification of a custody decree are, under most states' 
jurisprudence, entirely outside that parent's control and may never 
occur. 99 For these reasons, the right to counsel should flow from the 
potential loss of custody, rather than from the public or private nature 
of the adversary. 
The ABA Resolution also focuses on adversarial proceedings, 
because such matters are inherently complex and lack of lawyer 
representation for indigent persons poses the greatest concern in this 
context. 100 The ABA Report emphasizes the level of training and 
expertise required of attorneys and states that "[ w lith rare exceptions, 
non-lawyers lack the knowledge, specialized expertise and skills to 
[represent themselves] and are destined to have limited success no 
matter how valid their position may be .... ,,101 
The presence of lawyers in a civil case makes a substantial 
difference to the outcome of the proceedings,102 which is why those 
who can afford lawyers hire them. Research bears this out. 103 
96. See, e.g., id. at 138, 840 A.2d at 136 (Cathell, J., concurring) (expressing fear that, in 
private custody battles, "affluent third parties, by reason of the quality of the legal 
representation their affluence brings them, may be able to simply overwhelm poor 
parents who cannot afford counsel in a civil adversarial system that is not permitted 
to fully ensure equality in the presentation of cases."). 
97. See id. at 140-41, 840 A.2d at 138 (Cathell, J., concurring). 
98. In re Welfare of Myricks, 533 P.2d 841, 842 (Wash. 1975). 
99. See, e.g., McCready v. McCready, 323 Md. 476, 481-82, 593 A.2d Il28, 1130--31 
(1991). 
101. ABA TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 517-18,521. 
101. Id. at 517. It should be remembered that, in many states, including Maryland, 
unrepresented litigants are held to exactly the same standards in the courtroom as 
parties with lawyers. See, e.g., Tretick v. Layman, 95 Md. App. 62, 619 A.2d 201 
(1993). It has also been suggested that trial courts cannot be required to give any 
particular consideration to a litigant's poverty and limited access to legal assistance 
when determining such matters as whether to grant the litigant a continuance so that a 
pro bono attorney with a schedule conflict can represent her, even for a contested 
custody trial. See Touzeau v. Deffinbaugh, 394 Md. 654, 677-78, 907 A.2d 807, 
820--21 (2006). 
102. ABA TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 517-18. 
103. Carroll Seron et aI., The Impact of Legal Counsel on Outcomes for Poor Tenants in 
New York City's Housing Court: Results of a Randomized Experiment, 35 LAW & 
SOC'y REv. 419, 419 (2001). 
2007] Justice Delayed is, Once Again, Justice Denied 71 
Parties without lawyers are far more likely to fall prey to 
procedure. l04 This is ironic because modem procedural reform was 
intended to foster resolution of cases on their merits rather than on 
technicalities. 105 There was also a clear intent to close the gap 
between poor litigants and others. 106 While procedural reforms may 
have resulted in better correspondence of outcome and merit for those 
with the legal expertise to use them, studies continue to show that 
unrepresented litigants find outcomes based on merit difficult to 
achieve because of those same procedures. l07 For instance, at the 
most basic level, unrepresented parties have much higher rates of 
default. 108 
During contested proceedings, parties with lawyers make much 
greater use of procedural mechanisms that are key to success in civil 
litigation than do parties without. l09 Those with lawyers are, for 
example, more likely than those without to file motions (73% 
compared to 8%), request discovery (62% comfared to 0%), and 
receive continuances (35% compared to 3%).11 A party who is 
unrepresented but faces a lawyer on the other side is at a significant 
104. See id. at 427. 
105. Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 
105 HARV. L. REV. 427, 447 (1991). 
106. Kathleen L. Blaner et aI., Federal Discovery: Crown Jewel or Curse?, 24 LITIG., 
Summer 1998, at 8. 
107. See, e.g., Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination of 
Poor Tenants' Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REv. 533, 535, 552, 589-90 
(1992). 
108. Seron et aI., supra note 103, at 427 (indicating that an experiment showed only 16% 
of represented parties default versus 28% of unrepresented); see also Steven Gunn, 
Note, Eviction Defense for Poor Tenants: Costly Compassion or Justice Served?, 13 
YALE L. & POL'y REv. 385,414, Tab. 18 (1995) (indicating a default rate of 0% for 
parties with lawyers, 19% for those without). 
109. See Anthony J. Fusco, Jr. et aI., Chicago's Eviction Court: A Tenant's Court of No 
Resort, 17 URB. L. ANN. 93, 115 (1979); Gunn, supra note 108, at 411-12; see also 
Russell Engler & Craig S. Bloomgarden, Surnrnary Process Actions in the Boston 
Housing Court: An Empirical Study and Recommendations for Reform 7 (May 20, 
1983) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of Baltimore Law 
Review). 
110. Fusco, Jf. et aI., supra note 109, at 115 (continuances); Gunn, supra note 108, at 412, 
Tab. 16 (motions); Engler & Bloomgarden, supra note 109, at 17, Tab. 10 
( discovery). 
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disadvantage. III Her chances of prevailing drop by approximately 
half.112 
Perhaps obviously, lawyers' knowledge of and ability to raise 
substantive claims and defenses has also been found substantially to 
improve outcomes for their clients. I I3 First, represented litigants far 
more frequently raise such issues. 114 Second, raising substantive 
claims and defenses, as would be expected, greatly increases 
represented litigants' chances of achieving outcomes that reflect the 
underlying merits of their cases. 115 Applicants for domestic violence 
protection orders with lawyers succeed 83% of the time, while only 
32% of applicants without lawyers obtain such orders. 116 
Representation can also ease the burden on the courtS. 117 Parties with 
lawyers are much more likely to achieve settlement than those 
without. 118 
F or these and other reasons, the ABA is not the first, but is among 
the most rowerful, to suggest that, eventually, Lassiter should be 
overruled. 19 One commentator has asserted that "civil litigants are 
arguably at a greater disadvantage without counsel than are criminal 
defendants without counsel" and that the doctrines of Gideon and 
Lassiter are "irreconcilable." 120 
Gideon's recognition that the lack of counsel distorts the adversary 
process is no less true in the civil context, at least in cases that 
Ill. See, e.g., Robert H. Mnookin et aI., Private Ordering Revisited: What Custodial 
Arrangements are Parents Negotiating?, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 
37,64 (Stephen D. Sugannan & Hennan Hill Kay eds., Yale Univ. Press, 1990). 
112. Id. at 64; see also Jane W. Ellis, Plans, Protections, and Professional Intervention: 
Innovations in Divorce Custody Reform and the Role Of Legal Professionals, 24 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 65, 132 (1990); Engler & Bloomgarden, supra note 109, at 53-
58. 
113. See Marilyn Miller Mosier & Richard A. Soble, Modern Legislation, Metropolitan 
Court, Miniscule Results: A study of Detroit's Landlord-Tenant Court, 7 U. MICH. 
J.L. REFORM 9, 35,44-45 (1973). 
114. Id. at 44, Fig. 17 (83% of represented litigants raised available defenses compared to 
30% ofumepresented); Engler & B1oomgarden, supra note 109, at 19, Tab. II (80% 
versus 2%). 
115. Gunn, supra note 108, at 413-14, Tab. 18. 
116. Jane C. Murphy, Engaging With the State: The Growing Reliance on Lawyers and 
Judges to Protect Battered Women, II AM. U.I. GENDER SOC. POL'y & L. 499,511-
12 (2003). 
117. Seron et a!., supra note 103, at 427. 
118. Mosier & Soble, supra note 113, at 47, Fig. 18 (17% versus 0.1 %). 
119. ABA TASKFORCE, supra note 3, at 513. 
120. Joan Grace Ritchey, Limits on Justice: The United States' Failure to Recognize a 
Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 317, 336 (2001). 
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implicate fundamental rights or basic human needs. 121 Gideon's 
"obvious truth" that "any person haled into court, who is too poor to 
hire a law~er, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided 
for him," 22 applies with e~ual force to a custody case or eviction 
matter, for two examples. 1 3 Lawyers, in these and other civil 
matters involving basic human needs, "are necessities, not 
luxuries.,,124 The stakes for indigent civil litigants in such cases maz¥ 
be as great, or even greater, than those for the criminal defendant. 1 5 
The loss of custody of one's child is a life-shattering event more 
profound than the prospect of thirty days in jail. 126 The homelessness 
that may result from eviction could have consequences far more 
devastatin:B for an entire family than a short jail term for one family 
member. 1 
As numerous commentators have urged, the reasoning of Gideon 
applies with equal force in civil cases, and meaningful access to 
justice re~uires the appointment of counsel for indigent civil 
litigants. 12 In sum, as Justice Black, the author of Gideon, observed 
in the civil context: "[T]here cannot be meaningful access to the 
judicial process until every serious litigant is represented by 
competent counsel." 129 
Due process should protect more than physical liberty-it should 
also protect one's "freehold, liberties or privileges" and "life, liberty 
or property." 130 Limiting the due process right to counsel to 
protection only of physical liberty creates an artificial and illogical 
distinction.13I Given what is at stake in many civil cases, the failure 
to provide counsel "offends a sense of justice [that] impairs the 
121. Roger C. Cramton, Promise and Reality in Legal Services, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 670, 
676-78 (1976). 
122. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,344 (1963). 
123. See Cramton, supra note 121, at 676-77. 
124. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344; see Cramton, supra note 121, at 676-77. 
125. See Cramton, supra note 121, at 676. 
126. See Ritchey, supra note 120, at 338. 
127. See id. 
128. See, e.g., Simran Bindra & Pedram Ben-Cohen, Public Civil Defenders: A Right to 
Counselfor Indigent Civil Defendants, 10 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'y 1, 15-16, 
36 (2003); Justice Earl Johnson, Jr., Equal Access to Justice: Comparing Access to 
Justice in the United States and Other Industrial Democracies, 24 FORDHAM INT'L 
L.J. S83, SIlO (2000). 
129. Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co., 402 U.S. 936,959 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting). 
130. MD. CON ST. DECL. OF RTS. art. XXIV. 
131. Note, The Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 1322, 1330, 1332-
33 (1966). 
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fundamental fairness of the proceeding.,,132 Thus, Lassiter's 
presumption against appointment of counsel in civil matters should 
be abandoned. 
Another significant ~roblem with Lassiter is its relegation of this 
critical right to a case-by-case determination. 133 As the amicus states 
told the Court in Gideon, a cate90rical right is far easier to administer, and to administer fairly. 34 The need for fairness of 
administration cannot be overemphasized. A categorical right to 
counsel avoids arbitrarily uneven outcomes. I35 It also avoids the 
paradox of providing counsel to only those unrepresented parties who 
are fortunate or sophisticated enough to be able to articulate the 
nature of their ri?hts and their need for counsel well enough to meet 
the relevant test. 36 Justice Blackmun recognized this in his dissent 
in Lassiter, where he articulated: 
The flexibility of due process, the Court has held, requires 
case-by-case consideration of different decisionmaking 
contexts, not of different litigants within a given context. In 
analyzing the nature of the private and governmental 
interests at stake, along with the risk of error, the Court in 
the past has not limited itself to the particular case at hand. 
Instead, after addressing the three factors as generic 
elements in the context raised by the particular case, the 
Court then has formulated a rule that has general application 
to similarly situated cases. 137 
The provision of a categorical right to counsel as defined by the 
Court also promotes judicial efficiency by obviating the need for 
appellate review of individual cases based on distorted and 
misleading records. 138 As Justice Blackmun also wrote in his 
Lassiter dissent, "it is difficult, if not impossible, to conclude that the 
typical case has been adequately presented." 139 
132. Sites v. State, 300 Md. 702, 717,48 I A.2d 192,200 (1984). 
133. See Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18,31-32 (1981). 
134. See Brieffor the State Government, supra note 30, at 335. 
135. See id. (referencing numerous virtually identical pairs of cases in which counsel had 
been appointed in one and not the other). 
136. See Bruce A. Boyer, Justice, Access to the Courts, and the Right to Free Counsel for 
Indigent Parents: The Continuing Scourge of Lassiter v. Department of Social 
Services of Durham, 36 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 363, 379 (2005). 
137. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 49 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
138. See id. at 50-51 n.19. 
139. See id. at 5l. 
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At least one state court has openly rejected Lassiter when deciding 
the parameters of due process under its own constitution. 140 The 
court wrote simply that it "reject[s] the case-by-case approach set out 
by the Supreme Court in Lassiter," reasoning that "loss of custody is 
often recognized as 'punishment more severe than many criminal 
. , ,,141 sanctIons .... 
Such a reversal of fortune as the overruling of Lassiter is far from 
unprecedented. The Court overruled Betts in Gideon. 142 Other 
modem in~irations include Lawrence v. Texas 143 and Roper v. 
Simmons. 14 However, as the history of these cases reflects, much 
ground work must be laid before such an approach could succeed. 145 
Fortunately, the momentum for this effort has increased 
exponentially with the adoption of the ABA Resolution. 146 
Currently, advocates of equal justice for the poor are pursuing a 
broad spectrum of approaches, each fashioned according to local 
strategic considerations. 147 Poor litigants in Washington recently 
suffered a setback when, in King v. King,148 the Washington 
Supreme Court rejected claims for a civil right to counsel under the 
Washington Constitution in custody disputes. 149 However, local 
advocates were heartened somewhat by the two-judge dissent, which 
included the following: 
Ms. King's struggle to represent herself in this case 
demonstrates the legal hurdles that arise every day in 
140. See In re K.L.J., 813 P.2d 276, 282 n.6 (Alaska 1991). 
141. Id. at 282, 283 (quoting Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Right of Indigent Parent to 
Appointed Counsel in Proceeding for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights, 80 
A.L.R.3d 1141, 1145 (1977); see also Frase v. Barnhart, 379 Md. 100,138,840 
A.2d 114, 136 (2003) (Cathell, J., concurring) ("I am drawn more to the well 
reasoned dissents in Lassiter, as a guide to how this Court should consider these 
issues under our State Constitutional provisions in these evolving times."). 
142. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963). 
143. 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (decriminalizing private consensual homosexual relations 
and overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986». 
144. 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005) (prohibiting the death penalty for minors and overruling 
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989». 
145. These cases each overturned decisions that were controlling precedent for nearly 
twenty years prior to being overruled. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 189 (upholding 
Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy); Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380 (permitting minors 
to be subject to the death penalty). 
146. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text. 
147. Russell Engler, Toward a Context-Based Civil Right to Counsel Through "Access to 
Justice" Initiatives, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1. POVERTY L. & POL. 196, 197 (2006). 
148. No. 79978-4,2007 WL 4259926 (Wash. Dec. 6, 2007). 
149. Id. 'Il34-39. 
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courtrooms across Washington, showing the importance of 
counsel to a parent in a dissolution proceeding seeking to 
secure her fundamental right to parent her children. The 
majority's decision does not begin to address the obstacles 
an indigent parent encounters when she is unrepresented baY 
counsel, nor does it realistically assess the loss she faces. 15 
The access to justice community in Washington now turns its 
attention to developing other strategies to expand representation for 
poor litigants, including possible other approaches to securing a right 
to counsel. In other states, including Maryland there will be future 
appeals involving similar constitutional claims. 151 And in yet others, 
more incremental litigation is underway. One example is the recent 
Alaska Superior Court decision in Gordonier v. Jonsson, 152 
extending an existing right to counsel in cases where representation is 
provided by a publicly funded a~ency to cases where there is private 
representation on the other side. I 3 
Policy advocacy runs the gamut as well. A task force initiated by 
the California Commission on Access to Justice has created a model 
civil right to counsel statute that any state mwht consider adopting. 154 
Entitled the "State Equal Justice Act," 1 it offers a plan for 
implementing and administering a right to counsel in a broad array of 
civil matters. 156 The same group is currently at work on a model 
statutory framework for a narrower right to counsel focused on civil 
matters involving fundamental interests and basic human needs. In 
many states, bar leaders are forming study ?roups to determine their 
next logical step in advancing the right. IS Others have begun to 
think ahead about the challenges of implementation of a civil right to 
counsel, so that we are not doomed to repeat the mistakes of the 
ISO. ld. '\J 65 (Madsen, J. dissenting). 
lSI. See generally, John Nethercut, Maryland's Strategy for Securing a Right to Counsel 
in Civil Cases: Frase v. Barnhart and Beyond, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POVERTY 
L. & POL. 238 (2006) (discussing current civil right to counsel cases in Maryland). 
152. Case No. 3AN-06-8887 CI (3d D. Alaska Super. Ct. Aug. 14,2007). 
153. !d. at 10-16. 
154. See Clare Pastorc, The California Model Statute Task Force, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE 
REv. J. POVERTY L. & POL. 176, 176 (2006). 
ISS. The California Model Statute Task Force, State Equal Justice Act, available at 
http://www.brennancenter.orgldynamic/subpages/download_file_38656.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 14,2008). 
156. !d. at 1. 
157. See, e.g., Al Driver, Access to Justice in Civil Cases: A Right Whose Time Has Come, 
METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNSEL, Aug. 22, 2007, at 60 (featuring an interview with 
President-Elect Anthony Doniger of the Boston Bar Association in which he 
describes his plans for such a task force). 
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past. 158 Still others have begun to explore what implementation of 
the right might cost. 159 Regardless of where the effort to achieve a 
right to counsel in civil cases begins, it is clear that every sector of 
society will play a role in achieving victory. If a state court 
recognizes a right under its constitution, that state's legislature will 
have to provide the funds to implement the right. 160 Success of that 
effort will require significant public education. 161 Education is not 
needed to convince people that there should be a right to counsel in 
civil cases. 162 Education will be needed only to persuade some that 
spending for such a right must be a priority for a society that 
promises equal justice for all. 
158. See, e.g., Laura K. Abel, A Right to Counsel in Civil Cases: Lessons/rom Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POVERTY L. & POL. 271, 271 (2006); James 
Neuhard, Gideon Redux: A De/ender'S View, 28 CORNERSTONE 5 (2006), available at 
http://www.nlada.orgIDMSlDocumentsIl164033041.51IFall%2006%20Cornerston% 
20Small.pdf. 
159. ABA TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 523 (suggesting that the cost might be 
approximately five times current expenditures for civil legal assistance). But see 
ACCESS TO JUSTICE STUDY COMMISSION OF THE WISCONSIN BAR ASSOCIATION, 
BRIDGING THE JUSTICE GAP: WISCONSIN'S UNMET LEGAL NEEDS 9 (2007), 
http://www.wisbar.org/arnltemplate.ctn?template=/crnlcontentdisplay.cfrn&contentid 
=63639 (indicating that every dollar spent on civil legal assistance may save as much 
as nine dollars in other social costs). 
160. Nethercut, supra note 151, at 240. 
161. ALAN W. HOUSEMAN, CIVIL LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES: AN UPDATE FOR 2007, 
at 24 (2007), http://www.clasp.org/publications/civiUegal_aid_2007.pdf (discussing 
various Access to Justice Commission activities designed to expand public awareness 
and educate legislators). 
162. See, e.g., STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, STATE BAR REPORT: BAR SURVEY REVEALS 
WIDESPREAD LEGAL ILLITERACY, in CAL. LAW., June 1991, at 68, 68-69 (noting more 
than two-thirds of Californians believe such a right already exists). 
